The main players in the agreement are therefore deadlocked: the lack of political and institutional progress encourages the signatory armed groups to reject defence and security commitments. In an interview, a CMA official summed up the situation as follows: „We will not lay down our arms until we get what we took them for.“ Expectations must be realistic. No one should be satisfied with the current situation. At the same time, no one should push to rekindle the violence, for example by holding an unsuccessful referendum or redistributing the rebuilt army, which the signatory groups would consider to be cumbersome. The parties must take prudent steps to ensure more effective implementation of the agreement. Given the reluctance of the various parties to fully implement the agreement, there is no magic solution to the problem. But there are two main areas in which the peace process could be stimulated: confidence in the peace process and the political will to move it through. The peace agreement, which will lead to the direct election of local representatives, offers real potential for peace-building and strengthening participatory local governance. However, the silence of the agreement on the modalities for representing the interests, issues and perspectives of different groups within Malian society means that it does not adequately address the demands for inclusion that underlie all episodes of the conflict and risks perpetuating the resurgence of violence. Combating these representative aspects would provide an effective inclusive structural basis for the ambitious local government institutions under the agreement and would meet the self-determination and self-development needs of the various social groups that encompass Malian society. Like its Algerian counterpart, Mali`s peace and reconciliation process could have other important consequences for society. In Algeria, the reconciliation process helped an exhausted country slowly conclude a kind of peace and restore a level of stability and public order that was unthinkable for much of the 1990s. Their value should not be underestimated.
And yet, every roadmap, every MINUSMA resolution, every political speech and every donor-funded report on Mali invites the signatories to commit to implementing the agreement. The June 2019 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution extending MINUSMA`s mandate calls support for the implementation of the 2015 agreement a „first strategic priority“ for MINUSMA. Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita told the UN General Assembly in September 2019 that he remained „particularly committed“ to the agreement. And in March 2020, U.S. Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale told Congress that U.S. efforts in Mali focused on the agreement „which remains the best mechanism for achieving a peaceful and reconciled Mali.“ But clinging to this scenario is, at best, short-sighted and at worst dangerous. Asking stakeholders to implement the agreement – an incomplete and decentralized strategy – can do more harm than good.