6.4 The authorities shall, to the extent possible, give all interested parties a timely opportunity to consult all information relevant to the presentation of their cases, which is not confidential within the meaning of paragraph 5 and which is used by the authorities in the context of an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare submissions on the basis of that information. However, there are also fundamental differences that are reflected in the agreements. 8.2. Price undertakings may be requested or accepted from exporters only if the authorities of the importing Member have provisionally confirmed the dumping caused by such dumping and the injury caused by such dumping. Binding tariffs and their equal application to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment or most-favoured-nation law) are the key to the smooth movement of goods. The WTO Agreements respect the principles, but also provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. Three of these problems are: an increase in imports justifying safeguard measures may be an actual increase in imports (absolute increase); or it may be an increase in the share of imports from a declining market, even if the volume of imports has not increased (relative increase). The agreement provides for rules for the calculation of dumping margins. In the normal case, the agreement requires either a comparison of the weighted average normal value with the weighted average of all comparable export prices, or a comparison of the normal value and the export price between transactions (Article 2.4(2)). A different basis of comparison may be used where there is targeted dumping, i.e.
where there is an export price structure that differs significantly from one buyer, region or period to another. In this case, if the investigating authorities explain why these differences cannot be taken into account in the weighted average or transaction comparisons, the weighted average normal value may be compared with the export prices of individual transactions. But the WTO is an organization of countries and their governments. The WTO does not deal with business and cannot regulate corporate measures such as dumping. Therefore, the anti-dumping agreement only concerns measures that governments can take against dumping. Governments on both sides deal with subsidies: they subsidize and they exchange subsidies for one another. Therefore, the grant agreement disciplines both subsidies and reactions. Article 2 provides substantive rules for the determination of dumping.
Dumping is calculated on the basis of a „fair comparison“ between the normal value (the price of the imported product in the „normal course of trade“ in the country of origin or export) and the export price (the price of the product in the importing country). Article 2 lays down the procedures for calculating the normal value and the export price and the elements of the fair comparison to be made. Dumping and subsidies, as well as anti-dumping and countervailing duties, have a number of similarities. Many countries treat both under a single law, apply a similar procedure for dealing with them, and assign responsibility for investigations to a single authority. Occasionally, the two WTO committees dealing with these issues meet. One of the main objectives of the rules of procedure of the AD Convention is to ensure the transparency of the proceedings, the full possibility for the parties to defend their interests and the adequate explanation of their findings by the investigating authorities. The extensive and detailed procedural requirements for investigations focus on the sufficiency of petitions (through minimum information and „ongoing“ requirements) to ensure that no unfounded investigations are opened, on setting deadlines for the closure of investigations and on access to information for all interested parties, as well as on appropriate ways to reflect their views and to put forward arguments. .